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Chapter 1:Introduction
“The lines of national borders on maps are artificial constructs, as unnatural to us as they are
to birds flying overhead. Our first impulse is to ignore them.” - Moshin Hamid1
In the Middle East, the problem of nation-states and ethnic minorities after the first World
War  has  become  apparent.  Those  artificial  nation-state  borders,  created  by the  dominant
Western  forces  after  the  first  World  War,  have  created  tension  and  discourse  within  and
outside  state  borders.  Widely  debated,  Greater  Kurdistan  is  a  perfect  example  for  this.
Spanning four state borders, namely Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, Kurdish people seldom feel
connected  to  their  nation-state,  but  rather  to  their  Kurdish  identity.  The  creation  of  a
Kurdistani state is the wish of many Kurds, but the international community, and especially
the four states incorporating Kurdistan, are very apprehensive about the creation of such a
state. One of the reasons for this is undeniably the vast oil resources the Greater Kurdistan
region possesses, but fear of upheaval by other ethnic minority communities also plays into
this  (Gunter  201).  Moreover,  the  internal  division  of  the  Kurds  itself  has  prevented  an
independent state from emerging (O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 23). The case of Kurdistan is
exemplary, as the question rises how one can protect and enable the ethnic minority of the
Kurds and its state structures, while at the same time not discouraging the national state and
its sovereignty. This thesis will thereby examine how the Iraqi government, via constitutional
conferments of autonomy, has precluded calls for independence of the Iraqi Kurds. The case
of Iraqi Kurdistan is chosen, as — compared to the other Kurdistani regions incorporated into
their respective nation-states — Iraqi Kurds enjoy the most autonomy from the federal state
(Kelly 716). Moreover, the Iraqi government has always been apprehensive about Kurdish
separatism, namely due to fears of secession by the Shi'ites and economic deprival of natural
1 Pakistani writer, author of the novels “The Reluctant Fundamentalist“, “Moth Smoke“ and “How to Get 
Filthy Rich in Asia“
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resources (Gunter 201).
The case of the Iraqi Kurds can thus be transferred to other countries in the world,
which are concerned with ethnic minorities who do not support the national state, but their
own ethnic leaders. This lack of support of the national state by ethnic minorities often leads
to a weakened position of the state government, losing monopoly over the rule of law, and can
end in civil wars. As a possible solution to this dilemma, the framework of the Iraqi Kurdistan
state under the nation-state of Iraq may be applicable in these situations, and is thus of utmost
importance to be examined. With the integration of the ethnic minority of the Kurds, with
their  legal  and  political  autonomy of  the  Iraqi  state  as  established  within  the  context  of
federalism and distinctive rights and responsibilities, the problem of disloyalty to the nation-
state and calls for independence may be averted. As such, the legal framework within the two
constitutions can provide a par-excellence example for other countries in the world.
This thesis  is  structured as follows. Chapter  one introduces the wider topic  to the
audience. Chapter two will then focus on the historical and political developments in Iraqi
Kurdistan between 1991 to 2005. Subsequently, chapter three will continue with the historical
developments of Iraqi Kurdistani autonomy post-2005 until 2012. Chapter four will examine
the clauses in the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 pertaining Iraqi Kurdistani autonomy.  Moreover,
it  will  introduce  the  clauses  in  the  Draft  Constitution  of  Iraqi  Kurdistan  of  2009,  which
focused  on  Iraqi  Kurdistan's  relationship  and  integrity  within  the  Iraqi  nation-state.  In
addition to this, the discourse in which these clauses are situated will be examined. Last but
not least,  chapter five will deduce the most important points and allow for a comparative
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2: Historical Developments 1991-2005
As recently stated, Iraqi Kurdistan nowadays enjoys vast autonomy, as set in the constitution
and through other legal and political entities. Nevertheless, this has not always been the case.
As such, this part will first quickly introduce the political developments and short history in
the  case  of  Kurdish  autonomy between 1991 and 2005,  ending with  the  adoption  of  the
constitution. The Kurds, as part of Greater Kurdistan, have often been unable to achieve their
goals, due to their infighting and disunity (O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 23). Nevertheless,
Iraqi Kurds have been able to avoid this lock-hold and have always been better organized than
their counterparts, which enabled their relative success (O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 23). The
Iraqi state has always feared separatism by the Kurds, a result of the artificial creation of the
Iraqi state and thereby its lack of legitimacy (Gunter 201). Moreover, about 18 percent of the
Iraqi population encompasses the Kurds, and thus the Kurds portray an essential part of Iraqi
society (Gunter 197). 
2.1 Historical Developments: 1991 until Invasion of 2003
With the Gulf War in 1991, the political opportunities for Iraqi Kurds achieved broad success.
Long-standing opposition to the Saddam government, and repression by the aforementioned,
enabled the emergence of political autonomy. The creation of a safe haven for refugees in
Iraqi Kurdistan, as instigated by the United States and Europe, allowed the Iraqi Kurds to
achieve international recognition and political  prowess (O'Leary,  McGarry,  and Salih 23).
'Operation Provide Comfort' and the establishment of a no-fly zone allowed for the return of
more than one million Kurdish refugees (Aziz 83). After Saddam's government abandoned
Kurdistan in 1991 after the Kurdish uprising, “multi-party elections were held in May 1992”
(Stansfield, The Kurdish Dilemma 132). This separation of Iraqi Kurdistan from the Iraqi state
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enabled  political  autonomy,  a  move  which  culminated  in  the  election  of  the  Kurdistan
National Assembly in 1992 (O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 23). Furthermore, as restitution for
the  atrocities  that  the  Iraqi  Kurds  had  to  suffer  under  Saddam Hussein  under  his  Anfal
campaign, the Iraqi Kurds received international aid which supported the emergence of strong
institutional building,  economic prosperity and fostered a stable  environment (Natali,  The
Kurdish Quasi-State 29). While this resulted in immense dependence of Iraqi Kurdistan on
the  international  community,  it  nevertheless  was  crucial  in  reassuring  basic  needs,
rehabilitation and resettlement (Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State 31).  
The aforementioned May elections of the National Assembly resulted in the power-
sharing  between  two  parties,  the  Patriotic  Union  of  Kurdistan  (PUK)  and  the  Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) (Aziz 85). In July 1992, the formation of the regional government
took place, and in October 1992, the parliament declared Kurdistan a federalist state of Iraq
(Aziz 85). While a legitimate move, the Iraqi government did not recognize the elections, nor
the federalism, as fear of a quest to absolute independence ran high (Aziz 85).  Nonetheless,
this  set  the irrevocable path for Iraqi  Kurdistani political  and governmental  independence
from the Iraqi state. Unfortunately, the two power-sharing parties, namely the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, were unable to effectively govern together.
With competition between the parties rising,  the unified Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) collapsed (Stansfield, The Kurdish Dilemma 132). The KDP and PUK now governed
two separate areas within the Kurdistan region (Stansfield, The Kurdish Dilemma 132). While
the next years were characterized by serious infighting, even culminating in a civil war until
1997, the process itself corroborated independence and capabilities of the Iraqi Kurdistani
state (O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 25-28). In 1998, under the auspices of the US, the two
parties in power, the PUK and KDP, came to a successful point of negotiation and the conflict
ended (Packard 182). Nevertheless, discrepancies remained between those two parties, and
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the righteousness of official governing rule (Packard 183). Still, there are many shortcomings
concerning  the  economy,  legislature,  and  the  obstructive  independence  on  external,
international  funding,  not  only  during  the  1990s,  but  also  in  the  contemporary  context
(O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 29; Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State 70). 
2.2 Post-2003 Political Field and the Transitional Administrative Law
The  invasion  of  Iraq  in  2003  changed  the  sphere  and  opportunities  for  Iraqi  Kurdistan
entirely.  The  Kurdish  Regional  Government  was  accepted  internationally  as  a  legitimate
political entity (Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State 75). In 2004, the Washington Agreement was
crucial in managing potential conflict, distrust and vulnerability between the PUK and KDP
(Aziz 88). Long repressed by the Hussein government, they took part in the rebuilding of their
federal nation and gained political prowess. While an obliteration of Kurdistan was seen as a
possible  and valuable  solution  — not  only by the Iraqi  government,  but  also other  Arab
countries  and the  US  —  after  2004 the  existence  of  Iraqi  Kurdistan  is  legally  secure.  A
document of November 2003 proposed the establishment of governorates and “separation and
specification of powers to be exercised by central and local entities” (O'Leary, McGarry, and
Salih  30).  This  reflects  views  of  Arab  liberals  and  other  identities  who  wished  for  a
disintegration of Kurdish force and power, and wanted to create one Iraqi identity (O'Leary,
McGarry, and Salih 33-34). In the end, however, Kurds were successful in pushing their own
agenda  by  alluding  to  the  acceptance  of  the  federalist  Kurdish  region  in  1992  by  the
international community, most importantly the United States. In addition to this, the Kurds
participated  in  the  administration  of  the  Coalition  Provisional  Authority,  and  the  Iraq
Governing Council  (Aziz  88).  As  such,  the  Kurds  entered  the  post-Saddam context  with
increased influence and power in determining national politics. Moreover, it was impossible
to ignore the ethnically diverse make-up of Iraq, and the improbability of the creation of one
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Iraqi  identity.  This  explains  why an  approach  of  ethnic  nationalism in  Iraqi  nation-state
building was not applicable in the current composition of Iraq.  Thus, as late as 2004, the
Kurdish politicians were able to include and emphasize their autonomous and extraordinary
composition  in  the  Transitional  Administrative  Law,  ratified  in  March  2004  (O'Leary,
McGarry,  and Salih  35).  This  document,  negotiated  by the  Governing Council  under  the
auspices of the United States, 
recognized  the  existing  territory  of  Kurdistan,  the  Kurdistan  National
Assembly, and the Kurdistan Regional Government, and granted the region its
own internal security. (O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 35)
This Transitional Administrative Law, or officially the 'Law of Administration for the State of
Iraq for the Transitional Period',  represented an interim constitution and demonstrated the
necessities for the governing of the government (O'Leary, McGarry, and Salih 48). Important
to note here, is the incorporation of veto-power of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government
to a new constitution (Aziz 88).  Due to their composition in three provinces, namely Dohuk,
Erbil, and Suleimaniya, this veto-power was assured, though not exercised in the adoption of
the constitution of 2005 (Aziz 88). 
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Illustration 1: Autonomous Region Iraqi Kurdistan 
    (Dörrbecker)
Chapter  three  will  examine  the  historical,  political  developments  after  adoption  of  the
constitution in  2005, and inspect  the relationship between the Iraqi  government  and Iraqi
Kurdistan post-2005. 
Chapter 3: Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan Post- 2005 
This chapter will discuss developments in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq post-2005. It will discuss
the time frame of 2005 until 2012, as the emergence of the Islamic State has deteriorated the
situation in Iraq. It will thereby disregard these recent occurrences, as an engagement with
this context is problematic and insufficient, and not fit for discussion in this paper.  
During the drafting process of the Constitution of Iraq of 2005, the Kurds took an
unprecedented  stance  and  were  “politically  united  and  powerful,  dominating  the  drafting
process“ (Packard 183). This was essential in including new rights, responsibilities and self-
sovereignty for the Iraqi Kurdistani region. 
3.1 Liberal Consociation to Incorporate Diversity
In a May 2003 report,  Paul Williams stated that one of the biggest challenges to the new
constitution  of  Iraq  would  be  incorporating   “all  ethnic  and  religious  identities”   and
protecting their  interests  and rights  within the  new Iraqi  nation (53).  A big focus  in  this
research was the role of Kurdistan within the new order, as he felt that Kurdish participation
in Iraqi politics is crucial. Thus, a decentralized state is needed for this, but one has to be
cautious that it will not counter the integrity and stability of the state (54). In hindsight, one
can see that Williams, two years prior to the creation of the new constitution, was spot-on
with  his  advice.  Prior  to  the  Iraqi  War  of  2003,  Iraqis  felt  that  the  Kurdish  search  for
federalism was “an effort to […] promote the disintegration of the Iraqi state” (Feldman and
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Martinez 914). But this changed after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and due to the political
power of the Kurds at that time, who together with the Shi'as counterbalanced the Sunnis
(Feldman and Martinez 915). Federalism was thus seen as “the sine qua non of participation
in a unified Iraqi state” (Feldman and Martinez 915). 
Thereby,  some scholars  argue  that  liberal  consociation  was  necessary in  the  2005
constitution, to incorporate Kurdish nationalistic sentiment within the framework of the Iraqi
state (McGarry and O'Leary 670). Thus, not integration, but consociation was seen as the only
appropriate  choice  to  govern  the  Iraqi  multi-cultural  society.  This  resulted  from  an
accomodationist  view point  on identity,  which in  certain cases,  such as with the Kurdish
identity,  sees  identity  as  stable,  fixed  and  resilient  (McGarry  and  O'Leary  671).  Hence,
integration would not have reaped benefits, as the merging of these often opposing identities
would have created more tension, and therefore strengthening the pluralist tendencies of Iraqi
culture  was  the  only  option.  This  is  in  accordance  with  the  occurrences  post-2003.  As
mentioned  earlier,  the  Iraqi  government  tried  to  create  one,  unified  Iraqi  identity.  This
attempt, pushed forward by Arab liberals, was unsuccessful, and in the end it became clear
that Kurdish identity was impossible to dissolve or integrate into Iraqi identity (Feldman and
Martinez  915).  Iraqi  society  is  diverse  and  divided,  and  the  Kurds,  for  example,  do  not
identify as Iraqis. In 2007, a survey among university student asked in Iraqi Kurdistan which
national identity they feel to belong to. The answer was unambiguous: 90,44% stated they feel
either as Kurd, or Kurdistani (Aziz 118). Only 3% answered they either felt more Iraqi than
Kurd, or only Iraqi and not Kurd (Aziz 118). Moreover, only 1.33% identified as Iraqi Kurds
(Aziz  118).  As  such,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  creation  of  one  Iraqi  identity,  which
encompasses all ethnicities and regions, would be impossible. Thereby, with the constitutional
clauses of creating federalist regions, and allowing Iraqi Kurdistan semi-autonomy, the Iraqi
federal government was able to maintain their stronghold over the Kurdistani region without
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creating too much tension. By making amends to the Kurdistan Regional Government, they
showed that an integration as a quasi-state into the Iraqi state was possible and would reap
benefits for the Kurdish people. As such, the federal government successfully incorporated
the Kurds into the federal structure, whilst still accepting their need for autonomy and self-
identity. 
This  notion  of  appeasement  is  further  supported  by  Article  140  in  the  Iraqi
Constitution of 2005, which will be thoroughly examined in chapter four. Article 140 of the
constitution  alludes  to  the  disputed  territories,  such  as  Kirkuk.  As  such,  it  promotes
resettlement of Arabs and Kurds (Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State 81). Moreover, it mentions
the  modification  of  the  administrative  framework  (Natali,  The  Kurdish  Quasi-State 81).
Additionally, and most importantly, Article 140 introduces a referendum by the population,
determining the status of Kirkuk, either as part of the Kurdistan Regional Government, or the
federal state of Iraq (Natali,  The Kurdish Quasi-State 81). Thereby, the federal state of Iraq
acknowledges the ambiguity of Kirkuk, and the clauses added show that federal Iraq cannot
deny its belonging to the Kurdistan region.  These amends were thereby necessary to quell
dissent in the Kurdish population, and were thus used to appease the recently unified political
Kurdistan power and thereby deny opportunities of uprising and quest for self-determination,
which would inevitably result in an annexation of Kirkuk. 
This  persistent  uncertainty  is  partly  attributed  to  Iraq’s  new  constitutional
arrangements, variously decried (by their critics) for too much decentralization
and applauded (by their  champions)  as a  realistic  accommodation of  Iraq’s
communities.  The constitutional  process was seen as  a  negotiation between
Shi‘i and Kurdish party leaders and the US, and was largely rejected by Sunni
Arabs (Bartu 1331).
As  such,  one  can  see  that  minorities  previously  ignored  and  subjugated  by  the  Hussein
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government, gained exemplary rights within the post-Saddam context. 
3.2 The Washington Agreement and Collaboration between the PUK and KDP
This necessity of cooperation, arising from the wish to play an active political role, resulted in
the Washington Agreement, which allowed for collaboration between the PUK and KDP as
one unified actor, and their decision to enter the Iraqi elections of 2005 as one single entity.
Thereby, one can see that the drafting process of the constitution itself, and the opportunities
that presented itself to the Kurdistani political elite when acting unified, were conducive in
creating a collaboration between the two power-sharing parties. The Kurdistan Democratic
Party  and  the  Patriotic  Union  of  Kurdistan  successfully  collaborated  during  the  drafting
process of the constitution,  despite  prior rivalries  and bitter  infighting,  and protected and
secured Kurdish interests, such as a strong federal Iraqi system (Feldman and Martinez 888).
As  such,  Kurdistan's  political  actors  were  able  to  gain  political  prowess  and  achieve
legitimacy  in  the  overall  political  sphere  of  Iraqi  politics  by  acting  united  and  pushing
forward  their  constitutional  agenda.  Stansfield notes  that  the  Kurds,  after  the  invasion of
2003, in difference to historical notions, are nowadays no longer openly divided, play a big
role in Iraqi politics and are acknowledged internationally (Governing Kurdistan 210). Thus,
he argues, the demands of autonomy by the Kurds over Kirkuk (with the resource revenues
distributed to all of Iraq), which have so far not been met, are inevitable due to the strong
position and unity of the KDP and PUK. Denise Natali shares the point of view that Iraqi
Kurdistan is a quasi-state nowadays, and is an internationally recognized and legitimate entity
(“The  Spoils  of  Peace”  1111).  Moreover,  Natali  agrees  that  the  Kurdistan  Regional
Government was empowered by the Constitution of 2005 and thereby achieved its prominent
role  (“The  Spoils  of  Peace”  1111),  thus  also  awarding  the  constitution  a  central  role  in
Kurdish state power. 
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After  years  of  tension,  the  PUK  and  KDP brokered  a  deal  in  2006,  called  the
Kurdistan  Regional  Government  Unification  Agreement,  which  allowed  effective  power-
sharing between the two parties (Packard 183). Since then, the leadership or Iraqi Kurdistan
Government has been effective and has acted as a de-facto sovereign entity from the Iraqi
state, exercising its power in unity (Packard 183). In the Kurdistan region, political pluralism
was diversified and the representation of diverse parties, ethnicities and religious groups grew
of importance in institutions and politics (Natali,  The Kurdish Quasi-State 84). As such, one
can examine  “the entry into parliament  of members  of various demographic groups,  e.g.,
women and minorities, and of diverse territorial, linguistic and socio-economic segments of
society“ (Banai 267). Additionally, the KDP and PUK grew closer together and cooperated as
one single unity, as exemplified in the decision of running as one Kurdistani list in the 2005
Iraqi  elections  (Natali,  The Kurdish  Quasi-State 84).  This  can  be  seen as  a  result  of  the
successes reaping from collaborative action in the  case of the drafting process of the Iraqi
Constitution of 2005, which thus showed the PUK and KDP that cooperation is needed to
increase autonomy from the federal state and gain political prowess.
3.3 Discrepancies between Arbil and Baghdad 
The Kurdistani government, post-2003, reinforced Kurdish nationhood, improved economic
vibrancy, and re-emphasized political unity (Aziz 90). Exemplary, “employment, economic,
and  demographic  trends  have  increased  standards  of  living”  (Aziz  99).  Moreover,  the
emergence  of  civil  society  is  a  clear  trend  in  post-Saddam Iraqi  Kurdistan  (Natali,  The
Kurdish Quasi-State 80; Aziz 101). This clear distinction from other regions in Iraq, where
economic stagnation and unemployment are abundant, has resulted in what Aziz called 'The
other  Iraq'  (103).  The  vibrancy and  political  freedom of  Iraqi  Kurdistan  is  thus  in  stark
contrast to conditions in other parts of Iraq. 
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While there have been conferments of autonomy to Iraqi Kurdistan in the constitution
of  2005,  in  the  form of  new rights,  there  is  still  unresolved tension  between the  federal
government  and the Kurdistani  region (Aziz 103).  Moreover,  while the emergence of the
Kurdish quasi-state  has been aided by the invasion of 2003 and a post-Saddam road, the
reliance on international political support, funding and patronage, discourages self-sufficiency
and autonomy for the region as a whole (Aziz 103). 
If  one examines  the relationship between Arbil  and Baghdad,  there are  still  many
discrepancies that have not been bridged in the post-Saddam context. Namely, security issues,
differences  in  forms of  administration,  and political  mistrust  (Aziz 104-106).  In terms of
security  issues,  the  Kurdistan  Regional  Government  has  “demanded  a  strict  security
environment” in order to prevent instability of other Iraqi regions to reach its borders (Aziz
104). This has resulted in increased distrust between Arabs and Kurds. In addition to this,
“institutional ties between regions remain virtually non-existent”, and as such cooperation is
low (Aziz 104). Additionally, the political environment guided by mistrust remains even after
the fall of the Hussein regime. While the Kurdistan Regional Government does support the
Iraqi Constitution of 2005, presumably due to their inscripted new rights, Sunni Arab groups
do in fact not, and wish for amendments which would decrease the role of the Kurds, and
increase  their  own political  rights  (Jawad  19).  This  is  exemplified  by a  rejection  of  the
constitution  in  two Sunni-majority  provinces,  and  a  call  for  amendments  by Sunni  Arab
political  figures  and the  Sunni  population  (Jawad 14;19)   However,  not  only these  Arab
groups  wish  for  improvements  in  the  constitution,  but  the  Kurds  also  see  possible
improvements.  One still  debated topic is the integration of Kirkuk into the region. While
demographically (and arguably geographically) Kurdistani, due to the vast oil resources and
thus potential revenue in the area, federal Iraq does not want its integration in the Kurdistani
Iraqi region and thus remain its stronghold on resources (Aziz 107-110; Jawad 12). However,
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as previously mentioned, Article 140 in the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 addresses these issues
of  disputed  territories  in  terms  of  resettlement  of  Kurds  and  Arabs,  reshaping  of
administrative structures and a possible referendum to decide belonging to the KRG or the
central state (Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State 81). 
Nonetheless, through the Advanced Development Provincial Reconstruction program,
the Iraqi federal state further encouraged regional decentralization and increased allocated
resources  to  the  Kurdistan's  regions  provincial  council  300 percent  (Natali,  The  Kurdish
Quasi-State 82). Imported in 2005 by Afghan example, the reconstruction program provides
assistance  to  “provincial  and local  governments  in  Iraq  to  govern effectively and deliver
essential services” (Perito 1). Additionally, the Kurdistan Regional Government also receives
17 per cent of all petroleum exported revenues from Iraq (Holland 28).  Moreover, despite
continuous mistrust between the central state and the Kurdistan region, “after 2003 it gained
important  representation  in  Baghdad”  and  Kurdish  officials  were  appointed  to  high-level
positions, such as in ministries or administrative posts, often in key central roles (Natali, The
Kurdish Quasi-State 81). Additionally, “federalist structures gave the KRG the authority to
alter Iraqi laws not related to foreign policy, national security, or financial issues; to control its
own police and security forces; and to manage natural resources in the region” (Natali,  The
Kurdish Quasi-State 81)2.  “Not only did the constitution allow for  the legal  extension of
Kurdish autonomy demands into the framework of governance throughout the country, the
Kurds were also king-makers in the new politics“ (Bartu 1333). 
Thereby, one can clearly see that the Iraqi government attempted to increase support
and make amends to the Kurdistani region, in hope of repairing the strained relationship and
thus precluding calls for independence and integrating the region inside its federal structure.
Despite years of oppression, persecution, and civil war, nowadays one can declare the Iraqi
2 For more information see Chapter four on constitutional clauses in the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 pertaining 
the Kurdish region
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Kurdistani state as an “autonomous state controlling its own foreign policy, borders, security,
economy,  and natural resources within the Republic  of Iraq“ (Packard 183).  As such, the
federal Kurdistan region within Iraq acts as a quasi-state, with its own administrative and
political responsibilities.
3.4 Merely a Historical Process? Autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan
Gareth Stansfield argues in his essay that Iraqi Kurdistan has already been a state-like entity
that plays a major role in the international relations of the Middle East since 2005, thus that
this political power is not a recent occurrence (“The Unravelling” 260). As such, he argues
that  the  constitution  itself  lacks  the  political  force  necessary  in  determining  Kurdish
autonomy. Unlike the other actors, who stress the importance of the constitution, Stansfield
argues that  Iraqi Kurdistan's  greater  role has been twenty years  in the making, especially
voicing their opposition to Saddam Hussein as one of the reasons (“The Unravelling” 267-
269). More importantly, however, he notes the increased nationalistic feeling of the Kurds and
will to self-govern during the 1990s as one of the reasons for Kurdistan's state-like entity
(“The Unravelling” 269). Moreover, the Kurdish leaders as opposition to Hussein's regime
had become actors on an international stage, with allies in the US and Europe, which aided
the Kurds in pursuing and establishing their idea of federalism in the Iraqi Constitution of
2005  (“The  Unravelling”  270).  Stansfield  concludes  with  acknowledging  that  an  Iraqi
Kurdish state is now a possibility more than ever. Thus, this view of point argues that even the
constitutional  clauses making amends to  the Kurdish people are  the result  of  a  historical
process,  in  which the  Iraqi  government  could not  continue  avoiding the Kurds  strive for
independence. Thereby, this view decentralises the role of the constitution itself. Moreover,
while taking the momentum out of the strive for self-determination at the moment, one can
thereby  argue  that  once  the  situation  in  Iraq  settles  down,  Kurds  will  achieve  their
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independent state. 
Chapter 4: Constitutional Clauses and its Implications on KRG's 
Autonomy
My  thesis  focuses  on  how  the  Iraqi  government  has  instrumentalized  constitutional
conferments to preclude calls for independence by the Iraqi Kurds. As such, it is necessary to
examine the discourse about the constitution, and which impact it has had on Iraqi Kurdistan's
autonomy.  Chapter four will thereby discuss the Constitution of Iraq 2005. Within this, this
part will firstly look at the legislature applying to the Kurdistan region, namely Article 117,
120, 121, 140 and 141 of the constitution. Moreover, the political debate surrounding this
incorporation will be examined. In addition to this, and that will comprise the largest part of
this chapter, the discourse about these clauses will be analyzed. Therefore, this part will draw
conclusions and apply expertise from different  academic scholars.  Currently,  there is  vast
information available in which academics discuss the constitutional clauses itself, and what
they entail, but most do not go further and explain changes within the Iraqi Kurdistani state.
In addition to this, and unfortunately, there is still a lack of academic material available about
the role of the draft constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan of 2009. This can be seen as due to its
relative recent occurrence, secondly due to it still being a draft constitution, and last but not
least because there have been other academic priorities in the region, e.g. the civil war and
insurgence  of  the  Islamic  State.  Thus,  this  chapter  will  only  shortly  discuss  the  draft
constitution.
An article in the Harvard Law Review in 2006 argues that the reason for the improved
position of minority groups, such as the Kurds, has to do with the ratification process of the
constitution.  The “ratification requirements granted substantial  political  influence to  large,
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concentrated minorities in Iraq, specifically  the Sunnis and Kurds” ( “Democracy in Iraq”
1213). Due to the stronghold the Kurds have in specific regions, they could have vetoed a
ratification  of  the  Iraqi  constitution,  and  thus  the  Iraqi  constitution  of  2005  makes  vast
amends to improve their position and ascertain their power (“Democracy in Iraq” 1214). As
aforementioned,  with the Kurdish majority in  three regions  necessary for veto-power,  the
Kurds  were able  to achieve constitutional  benefits  which otherwise would not have been
possible.  Thus,  one  could  argue  that  the  ratification  requirements  itself  allowed  for  the
strengthened position, and not, the strong identity character of the Kurds 3. 
The Constitution of Iraq 2005 consists of two clauses specifically pertaining to the
autonomy of the Iraqi Kurdistan region, and others introducing the rights and duties of federal
regions, thereby including the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
4.1 Article 117, 120 and 121: Establishing Autonomy within the Context of 
Federalism
Article  117 (1) states  that  “this  Constitution,  upon coming into force,  shall  recognize the
region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.” Article 120 and
121 (1-5) determine the responsibilities and rights of such federal regions, therefore including
Iraqi Kurdistan. Article 120 thereby suggests the creation of a constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan
which designates the “powers of the federal region, its authorities, and the mechanisms for
exercising such authorities” (Constitution of Iraq of  2005)  4.  As such,  “the devolution of
power  to  the  regions  also  expanded  to  the  KRG's  internal  sovereignty within  its  official
3 as for example McGarry and O'Leary, or the Century Foundation and the Public International Law & Policy 
Group argue
4 “Each region shall adopt a constitution of its own that defines the structure of powers of the region, its 
authorities, and the mechanisms for exercising such authorities, provided that it does not contradict this 
Constitution“ Constitution of Iraq 2005, Art. 120
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territorial  boundaries”  (Natali,  The  Kurdish  Quasi-State 80). Article  121  (1)  allows  for
executive, judicial and legislative autonomy, except in cases of federal authority 5. Moreover,
Article 121 enables administrative autonomy, including police and security forces (Art. 120
(5))  6.  Thereby,  legitimacy  is  provided  to  the  Kurdish  Peshmerga  forces,  and  more
importantly, the forces are acknowledged as a legal entity. In addition to this, Article 120 (2)
states in case of a contradiction between legislation set by the regional government, and the
national government, and if the issue does not pertain federal authority concerns, the regional
government has power “to amend the application of national legislation within that region”
(Constitution of Iraq of 2005). Thus, vast power in this aspect has been attributed federally to
the  regional  government.  Thereby,  Article  120  of  the  Iraqi  Constitution  explains
responsibilities  and  duties  of  the  regional  government,  applicable  to  the  Iraqi  Kurdistani
region.
4.2 Article 140: Disputed Territories and the Shortcoming of the Constitution
Secondly, Article 140 (1) pertains to the situation of disputed territories, such as Kirkuk, and
alludes to the necessity of fulfilling the “requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58” of
the TAL7. The second part of the article stipulates the normalization of the context, a census,
5 “The regional powers shall have the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in 
accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the 
federal government.“ Constitution of Iraq 2005, Art. 121 (1)
6 “The regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, 
particularly the establishment and organization of the internal security forces for the region such as police, 
security forces, and guards of the region.” - Constitution of Iraq 2005, Art. 121 (5)
7 “First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the 
requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.
Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated 
in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority 
elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and 
census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their
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and  a  referendum  in  Kirkuk  (“and  other  disputed  territories”)  and  to  hand  over  the
administrative  jurisdiction  to  the  KRG  by  the  end  of  2007  (Bartu  1330).  Moreover,  it
reassigns the responsibilities of the TAL, Article 58, to the continuing executive authority
elected.  Thereby,  it  is  important  in this  context  to  examine Article  58 of the Transitional
Administrative  Law8.  Article  58  discusses  the  injustices  of  forced  migration,  settlement,
forced  unemployment  and  nationality  correction  in  the  past  by  the  Iraqi  government  in
Kirkuk. As such, it  proposes steps to remedy these measures taken,  such as resettlement,
compensation,  restoring  of  property,  new  employment  opportunities,  and  the  repeal  of
nationality  correction.  Moreover,  Article  58  (b)  of  the  TAL  proposes  to  re-examine
administrative boundaries which were manipulated and changed by the Hussein Government9.
citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007. “ - Constitution of Iraq 2005, Art. 140
8 (A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other 
relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous 
regime’s practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting 
and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of the region, settling 
individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality.  To remedy this 
injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps:
(1) With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, in accordance with the 
statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable 
period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide 
just compensation.
(2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in 
accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals 
may be resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near their 
residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to 
such areas.
(3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force migration out 
of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories.
(4) With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons 
the right to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.” - TAL 
Article 58
9 “The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The 
Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National 
Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency 
Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral 
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Additionally, Article 58 (c) states that before discussing the permanent status of Kirkuk and
other territories, these aforementioned measures have to be taken, and a census has to be
executed and the permanent  constitution has to be ratified10.  Only after this,  a  discussion
about the permanent status of Kirkuk can be initiated. 
Unfortunately, this article is also the biggest shortcoming of the constitution and the
political process afterwards, pertaining to the role of Iraqi Kurdistan. Article 140 (and as such
Article 58 of the TAL), which discusses the status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories,
could not be realized. 
By the end of 2008, a  realization had emerged across all  communities  that
article 140 could not be implemented without further negotiation and political
agreement concerning boundaries,  voter  eligibility,  the referendum question,
and units of decision (governorate, district and subdistrict). Initially rejected by
many non-Kurds, article 140 became a rallying point for even its most hard-
line opponents on the basis that it was impossible to implement. Up to now this
has left the administrative status of Kirkuk and the other disputed areas in a
state of suspended animation. (Bartu 1331) 
Moreover, in order to avoid the joining of Kirkuk into the Kurdistan Regional Government,
there have been amendments to the electoral law, namely Article 23 Council Elections Law of
2006 and the 2010 parliamentary elections law, instigated by Sunni and Shi'a Arabs (Bartu
1337). These measures were negotiated by Arabs to undermine the possibility of Kirkuk's
self-sovereignty  under  Kurdish  leadership,  and  thus  a  joining  to  Kurdistan.  Thus,  these
arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to 
agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished 
international person to be the arbitrator.“ - TAL Article 58 (b)
10 “The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these 
measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has
been ratified   This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of 
the people of those territories.” - TAL Article 58 (c)
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amendments enabled “to discredit the voter registry and to undermine any claims that the
parliamentary elections in Kirkuk could be described as a de facto referendum on its future
status.“ (Bartu 1337-1338). Thereby, one can see that even though this constitutional clause
was added to increase Kurdish rights and responsibilities and settle the dispute over Kirkuk, it
was relatively easy for the Arabs, as opposition to Kurdish quests, to override these clauses
and advance their own agenda. 
Thereby, one would be wrong to view the Iraqi federal state solely as a bestower of
increased rights and autonomy to the Iraqi state out of political pressure and the diversity of
Iraqi  society.  This  clause  140  portrays  the  opinion  of  some  scholars,  who  identify  the
constitutional clauses as sounding nice in theory, but in reality describe an overriding of these
clauses by the federal state, and thus autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan, as a relatively easy act. As
such,  this  implementation and inclusion of conferments  can be seen as  agenda-backed to
appease the Kurdistan Regional Government, but in reality still mainly adhering to the needs
of the federal state, if necessary. Burton and Deeks, for example, mention that there are legal
ambiguities that allow the Iraqi federal state to override these clauses, which de-facto shows
great potential for the federal Iraqi state to reaffirm itself (72-74). As aforementioned, these
legal  ambiguities  provided the  Arabs  (and as  such federal  Iraq)  with  the  opportunity for
amendments of electoral law, which resulted in the impossibility of integrating Kirkuk into
Kurdistan. Thus, while one can certainly examine increased power  and political weight the
constitution of 2005 attributes to Iraqi Kurdistan,  many scholars oversimplify the clauses in
the constitution and disregard its potential for the Iraqi government to hold onto its power
even within these autonomous regions (Burton and Deeks 73).  Reidar Visser, a specialist in
Iraqi  politics,  agrees  with Burton  and Deeks about  the  fact  that  the  constitution  with  its
specific clauses, commonly seen as providing the Iraqi Kurds with more power, in reality will
result in a decline of Kurdish power by 2010 (89). Furthermore, he stresses the importance of
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the rise of Iraqi nationalism in the years 2007 and 2008, instigated by former Prime Minister
Al-Maliki,  which  limited  and  decreased  Kurdish  power  and  demands  (Visser  86-89).
Therefore, Visser believes that after the initial increase of power and national character of the
Kurdish state in Iraq after the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, the Kurds' role in reality became
marginalized and decreased. As such, he is seen as one of the proponents who believe the
constitution to be a power-tool to in fact decrease Kurdish power, and limit their influence in
politics. As a result, this means that the constitution was instrumentalized to avoid calls for
independence, and by allowing for shallow rights, in fact actually undermines the Kurdish
quest for statehood. 
4.3 Article 141 and the Dispute over the Budget
Article 141 reads 
Legislation enacted in the region of Kurdistan since 1992 shall remain in force,
and decisions issued by the government of the region of Kurdistan, including
court  decisions  and  contracts,  shall  be  considered  valid  unless  they  are
amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of the region of Kurdistan by the
competent entity in the region, provided that they do not contradict with the
Constitution. 
Thereby, the legislation enacted since 1992 is still  applicable in all cases, except when in
contradiction with the Constitution of 2005. Moreover, such legislation will continue being in
force, unless an Iraqi Kurdistani body determines the legislation to be inapplicable or in need
for amendment. 
Moreover, the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 grants the Kurdish Region “an annual capital
investment budget of 17 percent of the federal budget”, which thereby increased by about 250
percent ( Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State 82). However, since January 2014 Baghdad has not
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met these constitutionally entitled demands, and the KRG only received 11 per cent of the
shares (United Kingdom Parliament). These funds are set to be redistributed to the KRG in
order  to  pay  for  public  services.  Moreover,  Baghdad  has  been  unwilling  to  fund  the
Peshmerga forces, which, as based on constitutional Article 121, are the legal security force of
the KRG (“Kurdish Ministers”). This has led to a dispute between Baghdad and Arbil, and the
KRG officials accusing Baghdad of not adhering to constitutional law, a claim which cannot
be refuted. Kurdish political actors have thereby demanded constitutional devotion, or Iraqi
Kurdistan will  secede from the federal  state (United Kingdom Parliament).  As such, it  is
important for Baghdad to adhere to the amends as inscripted in the constitution, to prevent a
further  unraveling  of  the  situation  and  enable  the  improvement  of  political  relations.
Nonetheless, this is a clear portrayal of how the Iraqi federal state has used constitutional
conferments to discourage the disintegration of Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, it also shows that
Kurdish willingness of affiliation to the federal state ends if the aforementioned does not hold
up its end of the bargain.
4.4 Draft Constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan of 2009
The Draft constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan of 2009 moreover introduces clauses pertaining to
its role to the Iraqi nation-state. Namely, and most importantly, these clauses are Articles one,
two, three, four and seven of the draft constitution. This draft constitution has been approved
by the Kurdistan parliament in Iraq in June 2009, but up until today has not been ratified yet.
This is a result of calls by the United States, who persuaded the Iraqi Kurdistani government
to wait for a referendum to avoid confrontations with Baghdad (Kelly 709). Article 1 of the
draft constitution explicitly mentions the incorporation of Iraqi Kurdistan into federalist Iraq
as a region. Nevertheless, the second sentence proclaims Iraqi Kurdistan to be a “democratic
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republic”, thereby reaffirming its independence and autonomy from the Iraqi nation-state11.
Moreover, this demonstrates the usage of language in the constitution, may it be political or
legal, which repeatedly insists on separation from the Iraqi state as an own political entity.
Moreover, Article 2 established the regional borders of Iraqi Kurdistan, all in accordance with
the federal Constitution of Iraq 2005, Article 140. Thereby, one can clearly see that the Iraqi
Kurdistani draft constitution does acknowledge the federal constitution's superiority, though
the language used in some articles questions this authority. Article 3 of the draft constitution
establishes the authority of the Iraqi Kurdistani government and its constitution. Thereby, it
authenticates sovereignty of the constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan and other legal entities, apart
from exclusive federal jurisdiction12. Article 3(2) reinforces the possibility of amendments to
federal laws if only applicable to regional conditions or outside its jurisdiction, and thereby
re-establishes  the  regional  government's  supremacy in  all  cases  except  when  exclusively
under jurisdiction of the federal entity13. Article 4 reinstates this matter, and reemphasizes the
right of the Kurdistani government to introduce any legislature deemed necessary without
consultation of the federal government, as long as it does not oppose federal law as instigated
11 „The Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a region within the Federal State of Iraq. It is a democratic republic with a 
parliamentary political system that is based on political pluralism, the principle of separation of powers, and 
the peaceful transfer of power through direct, general, and periodic elections that use a secret ballot.“ - Draft 
Constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan 2009, Art. 1
12 „The people are the source of authority and the basis of its legitimacy: said authority shall be exercised by 
the people through their constitutional institutions. The Constitution and the laws of the Kurdistan Region 
are sovereign and supersede all laws issued by the Iraqi government outside of the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Federal Republic of Iraq.“ - Draft Constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan 2009, Art 2(1)
13  „In accordance with Article 115 and Paragraph 2 of Article 121 of the Federal Constitution, in the event that 
the federal law deals with matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authorities, as listed in 
Article 110 of the Federal Constitution, or with other matters outside this jurisdiction, this shall not detract 
from the sovereignty and supremacy of the Constitution and laws of the Kurdistan Region, nor shall it limit 
the powers of the Region's authorities.“ - Draft Constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan 2009, Art. 2(2)
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in Article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution of 200514. 
Article 7 of the draft constitution is of utmost importance. It states that
The people  of  Iraqi  Kurdistan  shall  have  the  right  to  determine  their  own
destiny, and they have chosen out their own free will, to be a federal region
within Iraq, as long as Iraq abides by the federal, democratic, parliamentary
and  pluralistic  system,  and  remains  committed  to  the  human  rights  of
individuals and groups, as stipulated in the Federal Constitution.
This Article 7 shows the integrity of Iraqi Kurdistan within federal Iraq, but only, and this is
crucial in this case, 'as long as Iraq abides' by certain rules. As such, this can be seen as an
article which will be drawn upon in case of malpractice by the Iraqi state, and could thus
legally lay path for independence. While not acknowledged by the Iraqi constitution in itself,
this article still demonstrates the willingness of Iraqi Kurdistan to become a legal independent
entity,  if  federal  Iraq does not  cherish the disciplines  aforementioned.  Thereby,  this,  as  a
representation of popular opinion of Iraqi Kurds, can be seen as political leverage which can
be acted  upon so that  Iraq allows  Kurdistan  its  federal  autonomy and disintegrates  from
political processes within Iraqi Kurdistan. Thus, this Article 7 is a warning to Iraq.  If the
federal  state  of  Iraq does  not  abide by the  rights  and rules,  Iraqi  Kurdistan will  become
independent and “determine their own destiny” (Article 7). In practice, these demands have
been  made  in  2014  regarding  the  aforementioned  issue  with  the  budget  allocation.  How
rational or factual this opportunity of self-determination is, remains to be determined, but one
cannot deny its political leverage. 
Unfortunately,  scholarly literature regarding the draft  constitution  of  2009 in Iraqi
Kurdistan and its effect on the character of the Kurdish state is not available yet. However,
14 „Kurdistan Parliament may put into effect in the Region any federal law that is outside the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the federal authorities, as stipulated in Article 110 of the Federal Constitution of the Republic 
of Iraq.“ - Draft Constitution of Iraqi Kurdistan 2009, Art. 4
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Yussuf  Muhammad  Sadiq  addresses  the  issue  of  a  missing  constitution  in  Kurdistan
nowadays. While there was a draft constitution in 2009 which was approved by the Kurdish
Regional Government, due to calls by the United States it has not been ratified yet (Packard
178). Many scholars call the lack of a constitution as one of the most pressing issues in Iraqi
Kurdistan, as it has led to infighting, an unequal distribution of power and no clearly stated
relationship between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches (Sadiq 15). However, in
Sadiq's opinion, the draft constitution of 2009 ascertains too much power to the executive
which could result  in abuse of power by the president and dependency of legislative and
judiciary (15). Still, Sadiq believes that in order for the rule of law to be applied and to draw
clear power relations between the different political bodies, the draft constitution needs to be
implemented. In his opinion, a constitution is necessary in order for a democratic regime to be
established and the only way the Kurdish Regional Government can maximize its efficiency
and gain independence (15). Constitutions form the basis of a state and are the legal backbone
of a new state. Constitutions aim to 
1)  generate  legitimacy  for  the  state;  2)  channel  political  conflict  through
formal  institutions  rather  than  violence;  3)  limit  the  agency  costs  of
government; and 4) facilitate the production of public goods. (Ginsburg and
Huq 120)
They  are  thereby  essential  for  the  state-building  and  overall  governing  of  a  population,
determining rights,  responsibilities and restrictions for a state.  Thereby,  ratification of the
draft  constitution  by the  Kurdish Regional  Government  is  of  utmost  importance  to  state-
building. 
4.5 Implications of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 incorporates several additional and new clauses which allow
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Iraqi Kurdistan to act as a quasi-state. Namely, those are Articles 120, 121, 140 and 141. Not
only does the constitution increase the revenues of the region, moreover it also allows for its
own  administrative  structures,  its  own  security  structures,  and  autonomy in  the  political
sphere. Additionally, it acknowledges the special status of disputed territories, such as Kirkuk.
This can be seen as a formal acknowledgement of pre-existing political autonomy conditions
in Iraqi Kurdistan, which have existed and improved since 1992. Helpful for this emergence
of acknowledgement was the inevitable momentum and political prowess the unification of
the KDP and PUK created. Moreover, post-Saddam, changing political and cultural contexts
allowed for Kurds to be one of the strongest players in the field, backed by the United States.
In essence,  the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 improved Kurdish political  autonomy from the
federal Iraqi state.  Nevertheless, it is important to mention that there are legal ambiguities in
the constitution, which allow an overriding of Kurdish interests, if deemed necessary by the
federal state. A perfect example of this is the aforementioned avoidance of implementation of
Article  140  and  the  stalemate  status  of  Kirkuk.  Nonetheless,  one  can  clearly  see  in  the
constitution that the federal Iraqi state has made amends to the Kurdish region, in order to
maintain the status quo of the KRG as an entity of Iraq.  The best example of this notion of
appeasement is probably the insight that Paul Bremer, US head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, provided. He
reports negotiating with the Kurds their price for staying in Iraq on virtually
every issue, and navigating the constant tension of attempting to reward the
Kurds for their commitment to the democratic project in Iraq while laying the
ground  for  a  communal  accord  and  a  sustainable  security  framework—
interpreted, inconsistently, as re-enfranchising the Sunnis. (Bartu 1333)
As  such,  this  portrays  a  clear  example  that  the  Iraqis  bought  Kurdish  integrity  with  the
constitutional clauses, and thereby tried to avoid the quest for independence. Moreover, this
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also provides an explanation of why so many amends were made to the Kurds, as this ethnic
group  was  crucial  for  the  democratic  project  of  Iraq.  As  such,  one  can  see  both  sides
benefiting  from  this  project  of  integration.  On  the  one  hand,  Kurdistan  increased  its
independence and autonomy under the framework of federal Iraq, and this time even formally
recognized. On the other hand, Iraq discouraged separatism by the Kurds and reaped benefits
of  their  attempts  at  democratization  and  the  economic  benefits  of  the  resources  of  the
Kurdistani region. 
4.6 Exclusive Authorities and Increased Role
Michiel Leezenberg states that the case of secession into Kurdistan is used by Kurdish leaders
more  as  a  negotiation  tactic,  rather  than  a  real  prospect  for  the  future  (644).  Moreover,
Packard, like Feldman and Martinez, argues that the Kurds since the Iraqi Constitution of
2005  have  improved  and  strengthened  their  importance  within  Iraqi  politics  and  the
constitution allowed them to increase their power (184). Burton and Deeks support this view
in that the role of the Iraqi Kurdistani government has increased over the constitution and it
“ensures broad powers for the KRG”, unprecedented under the 'Law of Administration for the
State of Iraq for the Transitional Period', with exclusive authorities given to the Kurds (64).
Many scholars see the federalist state of Iraq as weakened, and the governorates' powers as
strengthened through the constitution, as exemplified in legislation set in the constitution in
Article 121 and 115 (McGarry and O'Leary 680; Packard 185). Feldman and Martinez explain
that the core of the document was a power deal made between the Shi'as and the Kurds, and
that  the  most  important  issue,  federalism,  was  included  to  meet  the  Kurdish  and  Shi'a
demands (900). In addition to this, a USIP special report in 2005, by Jonathan Morrow on the
constitution  drafting  process  in  Iraq,  states  that  there  was  no  opposition  by Sunni  Arabs
(politically the oppositional player of Shi'ites and Kurds in Iraq) to an autonomous region of
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Kurdistan (12). Thus, the United States Institute of Peace report declares this to be of no issue
whatsoever,  and the formality of taking the status  quo of  self-autonomy,  which has  been
practised  since  1992,  into  constitutional  law  was  of  no  issue.   Thereby,  most  scholars
ascertain  an  improved  position  of  the  Iraqi  Kurdistani  state  after  implementation  of  the
constitution of 2005.
4.7 Buying the Loyalty of the Kurds: A Failed Project?
Michiel Leezenberg writes in 2005 before the new constitution was ratified, “it is not very
likely that the drafting of a new constitution will in and of itself secure the loyalty of the
Kurds, or, for that matter, of any Iraqi population group.“ (644) This can be seen in the wish
of the Kurds to gain control of Kirkuk, which was elaborated on in a previous paragraph.
While the Kurds achieved and gained immense power due to the constitution and especially
during the drafting process, as exemplified by Leezenberg, they identify as Kurds rather than
Iraqis, and thus are not loyal to the Iraqi state even though they were involved in the creation
of  the  Iraq  of  today.  Thus,  this  demand for  Kirkuk,  which  would  further  strengthen and
centralize a Kurdish state, can be seen as in agreement with Leezenberg's view of disloyalty
by the Kurds toward the Iraqi state. This is important to consider, because having a valuably
sized minority which does not identify with the nation-state, often creates problems. Thereby,
the assertion of not achieving loyalty by the Kurds after implementation of the constitution,
implies a further quest of self-autonomy by the Kurds and disregard of the amends made by
the Iraqi federal state. 
As  such,  Leezenberg  proposes  the  idea  of  incorporating  beneficial  clauses  in  the
constitution to discourage self-autonomy, and achieve loyalty, as a failed project (644). This
opinion can be perceived nowadays as outdated. Yes, the Iraqi Kurds still identify as more
Kurdish than Iraqi, and do not proffer much loyalty to the Iraqi state. However, one can also
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clearly see that the Iraqi federal state was successful in limiting the Kurdish pursuit of self-
autonomy with the constitutional amends made to its population. Thereby, the inclusion of
these clauses has not disrupted the incorporation of Iraqi Kurdistan into the federal state. 
However,  Packard attributes the option for Iraqi  Kurdistan to become independent
from Iraq as one of 'earned sovereignty' (179). He thus goes further than most scholars in the
field, by arguing that Iraqi Kurdistan has the legal, political and social requirements necessary
to achieve independence and sovereignty from the Iraqi state, and links the case of Kurdistan
to others such as South Sudan and East Timor (179). In essence, he thereby disregards the
constitution as limiting the Kurds pursuit to self-autonomy and independence, and projects
independence as a valid option. Therefore, while the Kurds might be loyal to the federal Iraqi
state  at  the given time,  reasonably due to  the tumultuous situation in  the Middle East,  a
secession from Iraq is still a viable option for the future.
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Since 1992, Iraqi Kurdistan and the Kurdish Regional Government increasingly performed
autonomously from the Iraqi state. Backed by international actors, such as the US and Europe,
aid programs allowed for political autonomy, economic prosperity and the emergence of a
secure environment.  Unfortunately,  this political  autonomy culminated in a civil war until
1997, with the two power-sharing parties, namely the KDP and PUK, negotiating an end of
the conflict in 1998 under the auspices of the US. But discrepancies between the two parties
remained  until  the  Washington  Agreement  in  2004.  Iraqi  Kurdistan  has  a  long-reaching
history  of  autonomy,  formally  acknowledged  in  the  Iraqi  Constitution  of  2005.  The
constitution  introduced  many  new  rights  and  responsibilities  to  the  Kurdistan  Regional
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Government.  Regardless  of  previous  executions  of  these  by  the  KRG  since  1992,  the
constitution formally endorsed these rights and thereby provided a legal foundation for the
performance of the KRG. While this certainly aided in legally securing these responsibilities,
one cannot deny the agenda-backed inclusion of these privileges. Surely, the Iraqi government
knew that it was an impossibility after the US invasion of 2003 not to give the Kurds an
active  role  in  the  political  field.  On  the  one  hand,  Iraqi  Kurds  enjoyed  international
recognition and political weight, mainly accredited by the United States for their appreciation
of democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms. On the other hand, Iraqi Kurds had suffered
under the former regime and were in long-standing opposition of the Saddam government. As
such, the post-Saddam road was aimed at creating a democratic political arena including the
Kurdish minority, to enable the respect for human rights and active political participation.
Moreover,  the  incorporation  of  Iraqi  Kurdistan  into  the  federal  Iraqi  state,  within  the
framework of  liberal  consociation,  was crucial  in  order to  maintain the status quo of the
territorial borders of the Iraqi state. The creation of one Iraqi identity was a failed attempt, and
thereby the only viable option remained the incorporation of the diversity of identities in a
federal Iraqi state structure. 
The Kurds were actively involved in the constitution-making process in Iraq post-
Saddam.  The  ratification  process  in  itself,  with  a  veto-power  of  the  Kurds,  enabled
improvements and a strengthening of the political position. Moreover, the Kurds were also
seen as crucial in contributing to the democratic project in Iraq. This allowed the inclusion of
vast rights and responsibilities to and for the Kurdistan Regional Government. The tactic of
appeasement  was  fundamental  in  securing  Kurdish  integration  and  “commitment  to  the
democratic project in Iraq” (Bartu 1333). Thereby, the notion of introducing and reinforcing
new rights and responsibilities to the KRG, and increased financial aid by the Iraqi federal
state, enabled an averting of secession by the Iraqi Kurds. The Kurds nowadays are able to
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autonomously govern their region how they please. Furthermore, they have the capacity to
introduce  new laws in  their  region (as  long as  not  in  contradiction  with federal  law),  as
instigated by the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. Moreover,  the allocation of financial  aid has
increased  tremendously  since  2005.  Nonetheless,  it  is  important  to  mention  the  legal
ambiguities existing in some of these articles, for example the aforementioned situation of
Article 140, pertaining to disputed territories and as such Kirkuk. As such, it was possible for
actors to override Article 140 and thus Kurdish demands, and the situation of Kirkuk remains
uncertain. Moreover, the situation of the budget allocation of 17 per cent by Baghdad to the
KRG has recently not been met, and is of utmost importance to be resolved. Otherwise, an
independent Iraqi Kurdistan as a result of constitutional inconstancy by the federal state will
be the near future. Nevertheless, the Kurds enjoy nowadays a strengthened political and legal
position  as  a  result  of  the  Iraqi  Constitution  of  2005.  However,  the  introduction  and
incorporation  of  these  constitutional  rights  was  instrumental  in  avoiding  separatism from
federal Iraq. The adopted notion of federalism, to successfully incorporate different identities
and ethnicities into the Iraqi nation-state, was on the forefront of Kurdish agenda. It is clear
that the privileges the Kurds nowadays enjoy, and while strengthening their autonomy, were
used by the Iraqi nation-state to preclude calls for independence. The necessity of an Iraqi
Kurdistan under Iraq was too important for the Iraqi federal government to ignore Kurdish
demands, and thus they made amends. The Kurds, as an ethnic minority in Iraq enjoying vast
political power and rights, are currently not actively seeking secession of the Iraqi state. This
is certainly a result of the rights and responsibilities inscripted by the Iraqi Constitution of
2005. 
As Packard proposes, in the long run Kurdistan could achieve their own independent
status in accordance with the principle of 'earned sovereignty', which has been used in cases
such as Northern Ireland and South Sudan (185). This portrays the quest for nation-hood by
31
the  Iraqi  Kurdish  population  itself.  A 2007  survey  asserted  that  90%  of  Iraqi  Kurdish
respondents agreed with the statement that “Kurdistan should become independent, separate
from  Iraq”  (Aziz  135).  Thereby,  one  can  see  that  the  strive  for  self-autonomy  and
independence is central to Kurdish identity. Still, even though it is the wish for most Kurds to
gain independence from the Iraqi state, there are far more important issues to tackle at the
moment  than  this  pursuit  of  statehood  and  national  independence.  As  such,  with  the
destabilization of Iraq due to political  actors and insurgent  forces,  the Kurdish pursuit  of
sovereignty currently lies at rest.
5.1 Necessity for a Nation-State?
Michael Wuthrich opposes the modern assumption of the necessity of a nation-state for every
ethnicity, which can be applied to the Kurdish case. Overall, his point of view is probably the
most feasible, given the current political context of the Middle East. 
There is a danger of maintaining the same teleological assumptions derived
from classical modernization theory that there is a necessary and right process
of  development  which  begins  with  an  ethnie  and  ends  with  a  centralized
nation-state. This ignores the possibility that the current global context might
offer other possibilities for governance and the protection of one’s cultural and
political rights and that members of the group involved may not be of one mind
regarding their ultimate good – a complex view that would be extremely useful
in the Kurdish case. (Wuthrich 309)
Thereby, he promotes the integration of the Kurdistan region into federal Iraq as the most
viable  option  in  the  current  global  context.  One  can  see  that  while  certainly  a  daring
proposition, the incorporation of minority ethnicities into a federal state, instead of striving
for a nation-state, can be more appropriate. This form of appeasement creates benefits for
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both  sides,  such  as  an  increased  political  position  of  the  ethnic  minority,  a  decrease  of
violence  between  the  two  parties,  and  the  stabilization  of  a  federal  state.  Moreover,  the
creation  of  a  new  nation-state  often  culminates  in  new  problems,  such  as  forms  of
irredentism, destabilization of regions and the unravelling of political and security situations.
As  such,  the  case  of  Iraqi  Kurdistan  and its  incorporation  into  a  federal  state,  with  vast
autonomy,  rights  and responsibilities  for  the  distinctive  region,  provides  a  par-excellence
example  to  other  countries.  Constitutional  conferments,  and  thereby  the  prescription  of
distinctive rights and responsibilities to substantial minority ethnicities, can therefore aid in
precluding calls for independence. Consequently, the case of federal Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan
can be applied to other countries which are concerned with ethnic minorities' strive for self-
determination.
Thereby, the decision by federal Iraq, to provide allowances to Iraqi Kurdistan in order
to achieve integration, can be seen as beneficial to both sides. Not only does it allow for the
settlement of conflicts between the two parties, but it moreover promotes beneficiaries to the
Kurdistani regional government,  if  they remain a part of federal Iraq. Thereby, while one
cannot  deny  the  inclusion  of  constitutional  clauses  to  preclude  independence  for  Iraqi
Kurdistan, this does not have to be seen in a negative light. After all, what might the future
entail in case of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. Will other nations, especially those spanning
the Kurdistan region, accept such independence? Will it result in a deterioration of conflict?
An independent Kurdistan,  at  this  point of time, would be a huge mistake in  the current
unravelling situation in the Middle East. Such a proposal of independence might be feasible in
future times, once the region of the Middle East has calmed down. Right now, it is more
important to tackle other issues in the region, such as the emergence of extremist groups, civil
wars, economic stagnation, and basic human rights.  Thus, at the moment, the integration of
Iraqi Kurdistan as a federal region of Iraq might be the best option, for Kurds and Iraqis alike.
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